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Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
Iconography of Judging*
By ALFRED S. NEELY**
INTRODUCTION
Some judges are revered by consensus. Chief Justice John Marshall
of the United States Supreme Court comes readily to mind.' With others,
the reverence is far more mixed and complicated in nature and origin, and
the acclaim less universal. Even Justices Joseph Story and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., who many might think worthy of reverence by acclamation,
and who are ranked in the company of Marshall, flirt with unanimity, but
fall just short.2 Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Benjamin N. Cardozo also
* Copyright 0 1993 by Alfred S. Neely.
** Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. I am grateful to the Thomas
E. Deacy, Jr., Charles H. Reha, and Stephens Faculty Research Fellowships for financial
assistance in partial support of this Article.
'Marshall appears, for example, in Roscoe Pound's 1938 list of "the ten judges who
must be ranked first in American judicial history," RoSCOE PouND, THE FoRMATivE ERA
OP AMERICAN LAW 4 (1939), and in Professor Bernard Schwartz's 1978 revisitation of
the matter. Bemard Schwartz, The Judcial Ten: America's Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 405, 407; see also Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court
Justices, 58 A.B.A. J. 1183, 1183 (1972) (proposing another list); George R. Currie, A
Juicial All-Star Nine, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 3, 4 (proposing another list).
Frankfurter, too, was an occasional maker of lists. In 1957 Frankfurter identified,
from among the first seventy-five Justices to serve on the Court, sixteen "of distinction
in the realm of the mind and spirit .... It would indeed be a surprising judgment that
would exclude Marshall, William Johnson, Story, Taney, Miller, Field, Bradley, White
(despite his question-begging verbosities), Holmes, Hughes, Brandeis and Cardozo in the
roster of distinction among our seventy-five. I myself would add Curtis, Campbell,
Matthews and Moody' Felix Frankfutaer, The Sqreme Cowl in the Mirror of Justices,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 783 (1957) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Mirror of Justices],
reprinted In 44 A.BA J. 723 (1958); see also Felix Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions of
Judges: Should a Judge "T'hink Beyond the Judicial"?, 34 A.BA J. 656, 659 (1948)
[hereinafter Frankfirter, Personal Ambitions] (listing great Presidents and Secretaries of
State and War who were also lawyers).
2 Story and Holmes are included in each of the lists cited supra note 1, but only
John Marshall was "unanimously classified as 'A' by all participants" in the Blaustein and
Mersky poll of selected law deans and professors. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 1, at
1183.
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come close to unanimity, but share the acclamation of Marshall, Story
and Holmes in only most, but not everyone's, eyes.' For most judges the
judgment is even more mixed and the acclaim, at best, more ambiguous.
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court is of this
lot
4
Prominence alone is not a guarantee of the kind of respect accorded
the likes of a Marshall, Story or Holmes. Felix Frankfurter enjoyed a
prominence unusual for even a Supreme Court Justice. Long before
joining the Court, his reputation as academic, advocate, and advisor to the
country's political elite was firmly established! As one Frankfurter
biographer has commented, "Professors of law, even those who some-
times reach the United States Supreme Court, do not usually achieve the
status of celebrities in American society. Felix Frankfurter, however,
commanded the awe, devotion, hatred, and paranoia normally reserved for
presidents, generals, movie stars, and eccentric millionaires .... ." For
3 Cardozo appears on most lists of great judges. See POUND, supra note 1, at 431;
Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 1, at 1183; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 407; see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 143 (1990) ("[H]e deserves
to be called a great judge," although with an "abiding disquiet" that this label is the
product of Cardozo's capacities as a 'master rhetorician"). However, Cardozo did not
make Judge Currie's team Currie's interesting alternative to Cardozo was Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes. Currie believed that Hughes, outside Marshall, made as great a
contribution to American constitutionalism as any other. Currie, supra note 1, at 27-31.
Brandeis received "great judge," Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 1, at 1183, and
"top ten" status, Currie, supra note 1, at 3, 4, when the search was confined to the United
States Supreme Court. He did not make the list when the search was expanded to include
American judges without regard to court, federal or state. See POUND, supra note 1, at
430-31; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 407.
4 Frankfurter made neither the Pound nor Schwartz lists, which included American
judges without regard to court, federal or state. POUND, supra note 1, at 430-31;
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 407. However, he did make the highest grade of "great" in the
Blaustein and Mersky poll. Blaustein & Mersky, suipra note 1, at 1183. As a retired, yet
living, member of the Court, Frankfurter was not eligible for consideration in Judge
Currie's "all-star nine." Currie, supra note 1, at 3.
5 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE
REFORM YEARS 39-272 (1982); MARK SILVERSTEN, CONsnTrONAL FArHs-FELx
FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCEs OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 55-89
(1984); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANxFuRTE: JUDCIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL
LBERTIES 2-44 (1991)..
'*PARRISH, supra note 5, at 1-2; see also Wallace Mendelson, Introtduion to FELUX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHAIL, TANEY AND WArE vii
(Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1964) (1937) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER] ("[A]s one reviewer
said... 'Professor Frankfiter [was] probably the nation's best known teacher of law,");
H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFuRTE 99 (1981) (noting that during the
1930s, ' he was perhaps the single most important nonelected official in national
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example, in 1936 the editors of Fortune Magazine reported that General
Hugh S. Johnson, himself the influential head of the National Recovery
Administration, considered Frankfiter "the most influential single
individual in the United States."7 Yet Frankfurter's efforts as a Justice
have often, although by no means always, been taken to task.
govemment"); Dean Acheson, Felix Franlg er, 76 HARv. L. REV. 14, 14-15 (1962)
(drawing parallel between the influence of Frankfurter and Benjamin Franklin in their
respective times); Archibald MacLeish, FF.: frame for aportrait, 76 HARv. L. REv. 22,
22 (1962) ("Posterity may or may not take our word for it that Felix Frankfurter had more
influence on more lives than any man in his generation ... .); Tony Freyer, Book
Review, 36 AK. J. LEGAL HIST. 390, 390 (1992) (reviewing UROFSKY, supra note 5) ("As
a public figure... Frankfurter played a significant role as an intellectual and policymaker
7 RoosEVELT AND FRANKFuRTER: THEm CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 303 (Max
Freedman ed., 1967).
' One prominent critic, Professor Fred Rodell of the Yale Law School, labeled
Frankfiurter's advocates, admirers, and defenders the "Felixphiles." Fred Rodell, Book
Review, 59 YALE LJ. 1013, 1014 (1950) (reviewing THE CONsTrTUrIONAL WoRID OF
MR. JusncE FRANKFuTER: SOME REPRBSENTATIVE OPINIONS (Samuel J. Konefsky ed.,
1949)); see Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Franfdgter and the Process of Judicial
Review, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 295, 320 (1954) (reacting in Frankfiurter's defense to the
Rodell book review). One commentator has observed that "Frankfiter until recently
possessed a gleaming historical reputation solidly rooted." Mark B. Rotenberg, Politics,
Personality and Judging: The Lessons ofBrandeis and Franifirter on Judicial Restraint,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (1983) (book review). Actually, critics such as Rodell
never allowed Frankfurter's reputation to develop untarished from the outset. Neverthe-
less, there have always been ample sympathetic supporters of Frankfurter. See genera!/y
WALLACE MENDEiSON, JuSTICES BLACK AND FkA~ TE. CONPuc" iN THE COURT
124-31 (2d ed. 1966) (discussing Frankfurter's restraint); William T. Coleman, Jr., Mr.
Justice Franlfurer: Civil Libertarian as Lawyer and as Justice: Extent to Which Jud"cial
Responsibilities Affected His Pre-Cowl Convictions, in Six JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS
85 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983); Acheson, supra note 6, at 14 (fondly discussing Felix
Frankfirter's affinity for friendship, getting along with children, and good conversation);
Alexander M. Bickel, Felix Frankfurter, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1527 (1965) (describing
Frankfurter as more than a judge, as a teacher and scholar, a friend and supporter of
justice, education, and liberty); Hugo L. Black, Mr. Justice Franfurter, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 1521, 1521 (1965) (Justice Black's comments on his personal relationship with Felix
Frankfurter and his respect for Frankfurter as a servant to his country); Ernest J. Brown,
Professor Franleuter, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1965) (giving his impression of
Felix Frankfirter's impact as a teacher on Brown's relationship with and appreciation for
the law); Jerome A. Cohen, Mr. Justice Frankfuter, 50 CAL. L. REv. 591, 592 (1962)
(noting how Felix Frankfiurter's practical background in public service gave him special
insight into achieving fair administration of justice); John M. Harlan, The Franfwter
Imprint as Seen by a Colleague, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1962) (crediting Frankfither with
a deep impact on his time and attributing this impact in part to Frankfurter's role in
keeping the judicial decision making process true to its purpose); Mark DeW. Howe, Felix
Frmlg§urter, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1526 (1965) (suggesting that Frankfiuter's strong
1993-94]
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The principal thrust of the criticism of Frankfurter has been that he
was too willing and quick to surrender to the will of the legislature-that
his philosophy of judicial self-restraint entailed an abdication of judicial
responsibility on exactly those occasions when judicial intervention was
most warranted.9 In a 1972 poll of sixty-five law school deans and
adherence to a belief in judicial restraint was necessitated by Frankfurter's awareness of
his personal zeal for causes dear to him as a man); Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice
Frai4Wer, 76 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1962) (commenting on Frank 's respect for the
legislative and judicial processes and how this respect was by no means obsolete); Louis
L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe ofMr. Justice FranifWer, 62 HARV. L. REV. 357 (1949)
(arguing that Justice Frankfurter does not make decisions based on classificaton as liberal
or cunservative, but rather, his decisions result from his views on many factors that bear
on the propriety of any particular decision); Willard L. King, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Retires, 48 A.BL . 1143, 1145 (1962) (discussing Frankfiurter's belief in judicial
restraint); John H. Mansfield, Felix Frankfier, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1529 (1965) (recanting
fond memories of his friendship with Felix Frankfurter and the profound impact of.
knowing him); Reinhold Niebuhr, Tribute to Felix Franlgiuer, 76 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20-
21 (1962) (suggesting that Frankfurter was guided by an enlightened balance of deference
to tradition, as well as concern for the rights of individuals); Thomas R. Powell, Wudicial
Protection of Civil Rights, 29 IOWA L. REV. 383, 395 (1944) (noting that Frankfiurter's
practice of judicial restraint was true given that he often deplored the action that such
restraint prohibited him from condemning); c CLYDE E. JAcoBs, JusncE FRANKFURTER
AND CIVIL LraERTMS 12 (1961) (presenting a generally sympathetic view of Frankfurter,
"one of the most criticized members of the contemporary Court," and of the relationship
between his 'libertarian activism" before joining the Court and his philosophy of judicial
restraint while on the Court); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in
Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1930 (1991) (discussing Brown
v. Board of Education, Frankfter's role in the decision, and "the deep structure of
Frankfurter's posture of judicial restraint").
9 One of Frankfrter's defenders suggests that 'his reputation has suffered not
because he was paralyzed but because the lesson ofjudicial humility constantly tempered
his judgments." Coleman, sapra note 8, at 88. What Frankfurter had created was -a
passive model of appellate judging" which he adhered to in the traditions of Holmes,
Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone. G. EDWARD Wmirg, THE AMERCAN JuDICiAL TRADmON:
PROFILES OF LEAING AMERICAN JUDGES 331 (1976). The result was "a consistent and
wide-ranging philosophy of adjudication: his particular version of passivity, articulated
in virtually unchanging fashion during his twenty-three years on the Court" Id His
philosophy of adjudication resulted inthe appearance of inconsistency with his previously
established positions. 'Many of those remembering him [Frankfurter] from the days of
his association with liberal causes and publications have the impression that his work: on
the court is inconsistent with the reputation he had earned for himself. As ajudge he has
disappointed in particular liberal and labor circles." THE CONSnTmIOxAL WORLD OF MR.
JUSTIE FRANKIRTER xvi (Samuel . Konefsky ed., 1949).
A further and ironical development that Professor Bruce Allen Murphy raised was
Frankfurer's continuing political activism off the bench even after he had joined the Court
and developed his reputation for apolitical judicial self-restraint on the bench. BRUCE A.
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professors rating Justices of the Supreme Court, Frankftrter was among
those who received the highest "great" rating. However, it was "for this
preoccupation with 'restraint' that one of the law professors rated
Frankfurter not great but a failure. He termed Frankfurter 'consistently
overrated', the point being that he used his brilliance to restrict the
development of law."1°
One of the sharpest of Frankfurter's critics was Professor Fred Rodell
of Yale Law School. Rodell considered Justice Frankfurter one of "the
passivists, the self-deniers, the apostles of undifferentiated judicial self-
restraint!"' who "come very close to contending that the Court should
never overrule Congress on constitutional grounds-that is, to disavowing
the right of judicial review that Marshall asserted in Marbury v.
Madison."'2 To Rodell, Frankfurter was the "chief spokesman" of the
MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRAN4KMR CONNECnON: THE SEcRET P01rCAL AcnvrriEs
OF Two SUPRaE COURT JUSTCES 268 (1982). Murphy suggests that Frankfirter's "two
lives" in this respect made Frankfurter's extrajudicial politics more palatable to
Frankfinter. Id. at 269. Extramurals of this sort were a source of discomfort and
sometimes denial for Frankfirter. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX
FRANKFURT R 345-50 (1975) (1953 exchange of letters with editor of the Forrestal
Diaries on what Frankfurter believed that Frankfurter had and had not done on behalf of
a Jewish state and how Frankfurter had stayed within the bounds of judicial propriety).
"0 Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 1, at 1184; see Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure
ofFelix Fran1=wer, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 175, 178 (1991) (noting that Justice William
0. Douglas shared this disappointment in Frankfurter, yet still placed him on his own
"All-American' team" of Supreme Court Justices).
Fred Rodell, Judicial Activis, Judical Seif-Deniers, Judcial Review and the First
Amendrent--Or, How to Hide the Melody of What You Mean Behind the Words of What
You Say, 47 GEO. LJ. 483, 484 (1959) [hereinafter Rodell, Judicial Activists]. A few
years before, Rodell had leveled an even more serious charge against Frankfurter. Rodell
claimed that Frankfurter's judicial restraint was only "selective," especially when his
mentors Holmes or Brandeis had voted a particular way in a earlier case, "or where a
liberal answer fitted his private blueprint." FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLmcAL
HISTORY Op THE SUPREmE COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 272 (1955). Rodell considered
Frankfurter "the New Deal Court's outstanding disappointment:" Id. at 273; see also
Rodell, supra note 8, at 1014-15 (disputing the "nyth' that Frankfurter was a consistent
proponent and practitioner of 'judicial self-restraint"').
Rodell, Judcial ActivisU, supra note 11, at 484-85. The case that drew Professor
Rodell's fire was Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). At issue was the breach-of-
peace conviction of a college student for a street-comer, political harangue. Justice
Frankfurter concurred inipholding the conviction. The professor considered the Justice
(and former professor) too solicitous of "public tolerance and intelligent police
administration" as the ultimate source of substance for the Court's own views on free
speech. Id. at 289. Rodell believed that the Court should take its own lead on issues of
constitutional protection of civil hlberties. Rodell, Judicial Activists, supra note 11, at 490.
1993-94]
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Court for this view of a limited judicial role." In contrast and opposi-
tion to "whole-hog self-deniers" of the likes of a Frankfiter were "the
allegedly illogical and inconsistent activists."'4 Rodell saw the activists
as appropriately willing to test the measure of a statute against constitu-
tional principles.
Rodell was by no means unique in his perspectives on Justice
Frankfurter. He was just more candidly trenchant in his criticism of
I Rodell, Judicial Acivists, suqra note 11, at 485. Outside the Supreme Court,
Rodell believed that the "[m]ost articulate living advocate of this view is the venerable
Judge Learned Hand, who has touted the propriety of judicial impotence in the face of
legislative arrogance." Id. See generally KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND
AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 208-10 (1973) (analyzing various characteris-
tics of judges who are judicial activists and judges who behevd in judicial restraint).
'4 Rodell, Judicial Activists, supra note 11, at 485. Of course, Rodell considered the
activists neither illogical' nor 'Inconsistent," and thought that the problem was that the
"self-deni"ers did not believe quite strongly enough in First Amendment freedoms. Id. at
485, 490.
The division Rodell described was not a new one. It had existed for some years, and
Frankfirter was but a recent illustration of one side of it On this side one found 'Taney,
Waite, Holmes, Brandeis, Learned Hand, Stone, Cardozo, and Frankfurter. These are the
humilitarians, the pragmatists. Recognizing that judicial legislation is inevitable, they
would hold it to a minimum." MENDELSON, supra note 8, at 115 (footnote omitted). On
the other side were ' Marshall, Field, Peckham, Fuller, Sutherland, and Black. These are
the activists. For them judicial legislation ... is the heart of the judicial process." Id. at
116.
1s See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED
LAND 43-48, 60, 129 (1988) (discussing how Frankfrter's stance of judicial restraint
related to his movement from outsider to insider, and how inthe process, unlike Brandeis,
he "lost his balance" and "always remained homeless in spite of himself'), reviWewed by
Thomas L. Shaffer, Judges as Prophets, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1327, 1327, 1330 (1989) (Burt
presents Felix Frankfurter as the 'Mllain" and, in the process, "is harder on the memory
of Justice Frankfurter than any respectable commentator I know about"); HIRSCH, supra
note 6, at 191 ("He ... choked off the opportunity for a truly creative jurisprudence; his
total commitment to deference [judicial restraint] led him into contradictions and,
ultimately, into absurdities."); UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 176 ("The problem ... is that
judicial restraint can quickly become judicial abdication."), reviewed by Freyer, supra note
6, at 390 ("Although he is regarded as an important twentieth-century American, Felix
Frankfurter almost invariably disappoints biograprs.... In each case the subject elicited
guarded respect subordinated to a general conclusion that when it came to what counted
most Frankfurter often failed."); Urofsky, supra note 10, at 175-76 (1991) (describing
Frankfurter as one of those "appointees who gave much promise of greatness [but] have
proven disappointing" because, in great measure, of "his abrasive personality and inability
to get along with other members of the Court' as well as his philosophy of judicial
restraint); Leonard B. Boudin, Book Review, 89 HARv. L. REv. 282, 284-85 (1975)
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Frankfurter, who Rodell said "wanted so hard to be a famous Justice,"
when he was "really a rather pathetic figure as he bustle[d] his way
toward historical obscurity.'"1
This picture of Frankfurter as judge is hardly flattering. It is one of
a jurist of limited imagination and limited courage, with a corresponding
boundless capacity for deference and even obsequiousness. The purpose
of this Article is not directly to refute these views, nor to mount the
campaign to rehabilitate the Frankfurter reputation across broad fronts.
Rather, its purpose is the more limited one of adding a measure of
balance.
(reviewing LAs, supra note 9) (discussing why Frankfurter should have been 'a
dominating figure on the Supreme Court... who... would protect the rights of political
and religious minorities," but who instead "emerged as the paradigm rationalist, the
academics' Justice" ... whose "primary concerns were with regularity, neutrality, and
judicial humility"); Walton Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1458, 1460 (1947)
("Mr. Justice Frankfiter has no feel for the dominant issues; he operates best when
weaving crochet patches of legalism on the fingers of the case.. . [Ilt is a calamity that
his skills happen to be petty skills."). See generally LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND
FRANKFURTER: A DuAL BIOGRAPHY 399-406, 466-68, 487-89 (1984) (discussing how
Frankfiuter's philosophy of judicial restraint brought criticism and division fi-om liberals
and some colleagues on the Court); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK,
FELix FRANKFuRTER AND CIVL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 16-18 (1989)
(discussing Frankfirter's stance ofjudicial restraint and how, among both the liberals and
conservatives who heralded his appointment to the Court, the conservatives were most
satisfied over the long term).
16 Rodell, supra note 8, at 1017; see also Fred Rodell, Book Review, 41 COLUM. L.
REv. 766, 769 (1941) (reviewing BERYL H. LEVY, OuR CONSTUTiON: TOOL OR
TESTAMENT? (1941)) (describing Frankfiter as "a spry and cocksure authoritarian[ ]-that
even the most elegant of language can not quite conceal").
H.N. Hirsch is a close second to Rodell in unsparing Frankfirter criticism. The
"central hypothesis" of his book on Frankfirter was "that Frankfirter can only be
understood politically if we understand him psychologically, and that we can understand
him psychologically as representing a textbook case of a neurotic personality." HIRSCH,
supra note 6, at 5. According to Judge Posner, the Hirsch biography is of the "controver-
sial genre" of "psychobiography" and has ',not been well received." POSNER, supra note
3, at 5 n.10.
Actually, Frankfurter had tried his own hand in a comparable manner on the subjects
of Chief Justices Marshall, Taney and Waite. He did so with the "utmost wariness" with
"[ilts chief impulse ... the hope of stimulating confirmation or contradiction, and
especially that pertinacious inquiry into the cultural and psychological roots of legal
doctrine on which very little spadework has yet been undertaken." FRANKFURTER, supra
note 6, at 8.
1993-94]
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If indeed Frankffurter did exhibit serious limitations as a jurist-a
concession of major dimension-the question of the origin of such
limitations is still to be answered. What was his sense of what he, as
judge, should be about? Was the problem one of execution of his ideals?
Is it the even more fundamental problem of inadequate aspirations-that
Frankfurter failed to even properly conceive what he should be about?
Putting aside concessions to Frankfurter's critics, it may be that
he had a perfectly fit and articulated sense of aspirations for
judging. It may be that his life as jurist was comfortably consistent
with these aspirations." If so, a picture of a very different jurist
will come into focus-one dramatically unlike that painted by
Professor Rodell.
I. SOURCES OF FRANKFURTER'S ICONOGRAPHY
Some of the answers lie in the judicial record Frankfurter created in
over twenty years on the Court." Another particularly illuminating and
interesting source is his writings on specific judges he especially
admired.' 9
"7See, e.g., Mark DeW. Howe, Felix Franfiafer, 78 HARv. L. RuV. 1526, 1526
(1965) (developing the "tentative hypothesis" that Frankfiuter's insistence upon judicial
restraint was "accentuated by his consciousness of his own fervor and zest").
" Justice Frankfurter joined the Court on January 30, 1939, and retired on August
28, 1962, for health reasons. Black, supra note 8, at 1521.
19 Frankfurter's activities in this respect were not limited to extolling the virtues of
judges and occasionally exposing their shortcomings. He wrote in similar vein and for
similar purpose of other persons, from poets to professors, and presidents to philosophers.
Nunerous examples of both are reprinted in the following works.
His writings of this sort were first published in FEUX FRANKFURT, LAW AND
POLIMCS (Archibald MacLAish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939) and covered the period
from 1913 to 1939. The continuation sequel was FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN
(Philip Elinan ed., 1956), and covered the period from 1939, the year that Frankfurter
joined the Supreme Court, to 1956, the year of the book's publication. The wor's origin
lay in a suggestion that his many memorials be collected and published, and grew to
include his papers and addresses while on the Court "beyond those elicited on melancholy
occasions." Id. at viii. A final entry was FEUX FRANKFURTE1, OF LAW AND LIE AND
OmR THINoS THAT MATrER (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER,
OF LAW AND LIFE], which includes papers and addresses from the years 1956 to 1963.
A fourth work of similar sort is x FRANFR TE ON THE SUPREM CouRTI
ExmP.AgJDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland ed.,
1970) [hereinafter EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS]. Many of the pieces included inthe preceding
three works are also presented in ExTCRA3DICIAL ESSAYS.
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These were the product of numerous occasions and circumstances:
they are found in testimonials upon retirement,20 upon death,2' upon
20 Felix Frankfrter, Calvert Magruder, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1959)
[hereinafter Magruder, HARV. L. REV.]; Felix Frankfiu, Calvert Magruder, HARv. L.
SCR. Y.B. (1959) [hereinafter Magruder, HARV. L. SCH. Y.B.], reprinted in FkANKFuRT-
ER, OF LAW AND LIFE, spra note 19, at 136; Felix Frankfuter, Remarks of Justice
Frankfurter at Broadcast (NBC) in Honor of the Tennination of the Service of Charles
Evans Hughes as Chief Justice of the United States (June 30, 1941), in Frankfurter Papers,
U.S. Library of Congress, Container 201, Reel 126, at 101 [hereinafter Remarks of Justice
Frankfurter].
" Felix Frankfurter, Letter to Chief Judge Simon E. Sobeloff Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit (Dec. 5, 1962), in In Memoriam: Honorable Armistead M. Dobie, 311
F.2d 5, 12-13 (Jan. 18, 1963); Felix Frankfuter, Letter to Chief Justice Robert B.
Williamson, Supreme Court of Maine (Aug. 22, 1962), in In Memoriam: Honorable
Edward F. Merrill, Late Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, 158 Me. 513, 534
(Sept. 4, 1962); Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1955) [hereinafter
Frankfirter, ForewordCoLUM. L. REV.]; Felix Frankfurter, Jerome N. Frank, 24 U. CRL
L. REV. 625 (1957) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Jerome N. Frank]; Felix Frankfirter, Learned
Hand, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1961) [hereinafter Frankfiter, Learned Hand, HARV. L.
REV.]; Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 181, 181 (1941)
[hereinafter Frankfirter, Mr. Justice Brandeis] (issue dedicated "to the memory of Mr.
Justice Brandeis); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 24 A.B.A.J. 638, 638 (1938)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo]; Felix Frankfiuter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and
Public Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 88 (1939), 52 HARV. L. REV. 440, 440 (1939), 48
YALE LI. 458, 458 (1939) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Cardozo and Public Law]; Felix
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1935) [hereinafter Frankfurter,
Mr. Jstice Holmes]; Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackon, 68 HARv. L. REV. 937
(1955) [hereinafter Frankfiter, Mr. Justice Jackron]; Felix Frankfirter, Mr. Justice
Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 312 (1955) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts]; Felix Frankfiut, "The Administrative Side " of ChiefJustice Hughes, 63 HARv.
L, REV. 1 (1949) [hereinafter Frankfuter, Chief Justice Hughes]; Frankfurter, Mirror of
Justices, supra note 1, at 781, reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J. 723 (1958) (the first Owen J.
Roberts Memorial Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March 20,
1957); Felix Frankfurter, Harlan Fiske Stone, in Y.B. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 334, 335
(1946) [hereinafte Frnkfiuter, Harlan Fke Stone]; Felix Frankfiter, Dedication to the
Memory of Learned Hand, HARv. L. SCH. Y.B. (1962) [hereinafter Frankfiuter, Learned
Hand, HARv. L. SCH. Y.B.], reprinted in FRANKFuRTER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note
19, at 224; Felix Frankfurter, For the 1949 Harvard Law School Yearbook Dedicated to
Charles Evans Hughes, 1862-1948, in Frankfurter Papers, U.S. Library of Congress,
Container 198, Reel 125, at 385 [hereinafter Frankfurt, 1949 Harvard Law School
Yearbook] (type-written manuscript); Felix Frankfurter, Tribute at the Funeral of Louis
D. Brandeis, Oct. 7, 1941, 87 CONG. REC. A4762 (daffy ed. Oct. 21, 1941) [hereinafter
Frankfurter, Tribute to Louis D. Brandeis] (extension of remarks of Rep. Thomas H.
Eliot); see also Felix Frankfurter, Nathan Benjamin Cardozo, 1870-1938, 11 Dicr. AM.
BIo. 93 (Supp. 2 1958) [hereinafte Frankfite, Nathan Benjamin Cardozo], reprinted in
EXTRAUDICIAL ESSAYS, £ria note 19, at 525; Felix Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
1841-1935, 11 DIC. AM. Bio. 416 (Supp. 1 1944) [he r Frankfurte, Oliver
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other important events in the lives of judges,2 and upon various other
circumstances& They appear in a variety of settings--traditional books
Wendell Holmes], reprinted in FEIX FRANKFURTER, MIL JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
SUPROEM COURT 1, 21 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, HOLMES AND THE
SUPREME COURT].
2 Felix Frankfinter, Remarks at Proceedings of a Special Session of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to Commemorate Fifty Years of Federal
Judicial Service By The Honorable Learned Hand, 264 F.2d 20, 21-22 (April 10, 1959)
[hereinafter Frankfirter, Fifty Years of Service]; Felix FrankfMrter, John Marshall and the
Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217 (1955) [hereinafter Frankfurter, John Marshall]
(opening address at September, 1955, Harvard Law School conference commemorating
the two-hundredth anniversary of Marshall's birth), reprinted in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER,
OLvER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FELX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 135 (Philip
B. Kurland ed., 1967) [hereinafte THAYER, HOLMES, AND FRANKFURTER]; Felix
Frankfirter, Judge Henry W. Edgerton, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1957) [hereinafter
Frankfurter, Judge Hemy W. Edgerton] (i honor of Edgerton's twentieth anniversary on
the bench); Felix Frankfirter, Judge Learned Hand, 60 HARV4 L. REv. 325 (1947)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Judge Learned Hand] (in honor of Hand'sseventy-fifth birthday);
Felix Frankfrter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 HARV. L. REV. 33 (1931)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Brandeis and the Constitution] (in honor of Brandeis' seventy-
fifth birthday), reprinted in MR. JuSTICE BRANDEIs 49 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932)
[hereinafter MR. JusnCE BRANDEIS]; Felix Frankfuinter, The Early Writings of 0. W.
Holmes, Jr., 44 HARv. L. REv. 717 (1931) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Early Writings of
Holmes] (in honor of Holmes' ninetieth birthday); Felix Frankfurter, October Days,
TODAY, March 9, 1935 [herinafter Frankfurter, October Days] (article commemorating
Holmes' ninety-fourth birthday), in Frankfurter Papers, U.S. Library of Congress,
Containers 196-97, Reel 124, at 227-28; Felix Frankfurter, The Moral Grandeur of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1956 [hereinafter Frankfirter, The Moral
Grandeur of Brandeis], reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE, suqra note 19,
at 54-55 (commemorating the one-hundredth anniversary of Brandeis' birth).
23 FRANKFURTER, HoLMEs AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 21, at 39 (Harvard
lectures on Holmes delivered in April of 1938); Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices IHave
Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883 (1953) [hereinafter Frankfuirter, Chief Justices I Have
Known] (infornal talk at the University of Virginia Law School); Felix Frankfurter,
Foreword, 3 AM. J. COWP. L. 1 (1954) [hereinafter FrankfinUt, Foreword, AM. J. COW.
L.] (foreword to publication of a rediscovered piece about American law that Story had
written for Continental lawyers and scholars); Felix Frankfiter, Justice Holmes Defines
the Constitution, ATLANIC MONTHLY (Oct. 1938) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Holmes
Defines Constitution], reprinted in RARDICLAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 377-78;
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of tatutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
530-35 (1947) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Some Reflections], reprinted fiom 2 Record of the
Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y. 213 (1947) (Sixth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture delivered March 18,1947); Felix Frankfurter, Benjamin N. Cardozo, COLIMR'S
ENCYCWPEDIA 418 (1962) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Benjamin N. Cardozo], reprinted in
FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LU., supra note 19, at 185; Felix Frankfurter, Speech to
Brandeis Lawyers Society, Philadelphia (April 17, 1951), in Frankfurter Papers, U.S.
Library of Congress, Container 198, Reel 125, at 47 [hereinafter Frankfurter, Speech to
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and law review articles, letters to editors, proceedings of courts,
biographical dictionary entries, unsigned magazine editorials, bar
association presentations, academic lectures, and even law school
yearbooks' These sources reveal Frmnkfuter's highest aspirations for
judging, ' although a few provide the sharp contrast of what he thinks a
judge should not do and be. ' The latter also offer some counterweight to
the concern that Frankfurter's high praise was more a product of his
celebrated capacity for flattery and the cultivation of friends27 and less
Brandeis Lawyers]; Felix Frankfurter, The Impact of Charles Evans Hughes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1951 [hereinafter Frankfuter, Charles Evans Hughes], reprinted in EXTRAJUDI-
CiAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 465; Felix Frankfirter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Consttution, 25 TE [N.Y.] CriY COLLEGE ALUMNUS-BENCH AND BAR NUMBER (Feb.
1929), in Frankfurter Papers, U.S. Library of Congress, Container 196-97, Reel 124, at
26.
Some are essentially traditional academic writings not triggered by any particular
circumstance. FRANKFURTER, HoumEs AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 21;
FRANKFURTER, supra note 6; Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution,
41 HARV. L. REV. 121 (1927) [hereinafler Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Constitution, HARV. L. REV.]; Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes'
Constitutional Opinions, 36 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1923) [hereinafter Frankfinter, lWenty
Years]; Felix Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Juhsice Holmes, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 683 (1916) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions]; Felix Frankfurter,
Book Review, 16 VA. L. REv. 743, 743 (1930) [hereinafter Frankfirter, Book Review,
VA. L. REv.] (reviewing TE DIssEnNG OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES (Alfred
Lief ed., 1929)); Felix Frankfiuter, Book Review, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 436, 436 (1929)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Book Review, U. PA. L. REv.] (reviewing BENjAMIN N.
CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)).
, See sources cited supra notes 19-23.
" See Professor Paul Freund's "perceptive remark,'It is frequently true of memorial
addresses that they provide a Uer insight into the mind of the speaker than into the mind
of the deceased'. .. ." Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Franlg'ier and the Reading of
Statutes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER THE JUDGE 30, 31 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964)
(quoting Paul Freund, Competing Freedoms in American Constitutional Law 26 (U. of
Chi. Conference on Freedom and the Law 1953)).
Similarly, in 1964 when the new Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
wrote of his selections to "an all-time, all-star United States Supreme Court," the editors
of the Wisconsin Law Review observed that 'in so doing, [he] provides us with a valuable
insight into what a Justice perceives as the characteristics of judicial greatness." Currie,
supra note 1, at 3.
S ee inffra notes 142-66 and accompanying text (discussing Frankfurter's views on
the travails and machinations of Judges Staley and Manton).
27 HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 42-45 (discussing his persistent flattery of his principal
mentors-Stimson, Holmes and Brandeis); David W. Levy & Bruce A. Murphy,
Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative T7me: The Joint Reform Efforts of
Justice Brandeis and Professor Franifier, 1916-1933, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1252, 1258
(1980); see Urofsky, supra note 10, at 182 (suggesting that rather than being an inveterate
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a function of true virtue. From both types of sources emerges Justice
Frankfurter's iconography of judging.'
None of this, or that which follows, should be taken as indication that
Frankfurter placed any judge above all others. In his mind there were
grand and impersonal forces of greater import in shaping the law and, for
that matter, persons more influential than the most revered judges.
Events, not men, have been the most powerful molders of Anglo-
American law. To the extent that men have molded events, the great
propulsions to legal development have come not from lawyers but from
those outside the law who have changed the face of society, of which
law is largely the mirror.. . . Edison and Ford have loosed forces more
transforming to the law than did David Dudley Field and Mr. Justice
Holmes?
Frankfurter's icons are best measured in this partial light At the same
time, Frankfurter did not relegate the judge to the status of meaningless
and mindless functionary. "One need not subscribe to the hero theory of
history to recognize that great men make a difference, even in law."
or consistent flatterer, "[Frankfirter] would flatter them so long as they agreed with
him").
= The present undertaking requires perspective and diminished expectations at the
outset A clear and consistent picture of what Frankfurter perceived as great judging may
be too much to expect As Frankfurter himself noted in speaking of that which is to be
sought in a Justice of the Supreme Court, 'Vreatness in the law is not a standardized
quality, nor are the elements that combine to attain it." Frankfumter, Mirror of Justices,
supra note 1, at 784, reprinted in 44 A.BA. J. 723, 724 (1958). Similarly, this Article is
no substitute for thorough and searching judicial biography and only a facet of what a
work of that nature would contain. Frankfinter, for one, also noted the special "difficulties
that confront biographers of those who are thinkers rather than doers," which he thought
compomded when the thinker happened to be a judge. Charles Fainnan, The Writing of
Judicial Biography-A S3yposium, 24 IND. L. 363, 367-68 (1949) (reprinting
Frankfurter's letter of December 27, 1948, in greeting to the symposium).
Furthermore, this study detennines and assesses Frankfiuer's sense of great judging
through only a limited prism, excluding whatever his judicial record might reveal. In this
aspect, however, the evidence examined may actually be the better evidence for the
purpose. Frankfurter himself might have agreed. As one Frankfurter commentator has
noted, "The most revealing insights regading judges and judicial behavior come not from
the published opinions but from a study of what Frankfurter once termed the individual
judge's idealized political picture of the social order." SILvESTEN, supra note 5, at 15.
The icons examined in the present study tend to be just that-idealized picture[s]."
2' Felix Frankfurter, Forewor, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 515 (1938).
'F P.aNFURTR, supra note 6, at 4; see Frankfurter, Holmes Defines Constitution,
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What he asked, however, was that the judge importance, influence, indeed
greatness, be determined in context and perspective.31
Importantly, Justice Frankfurter's icons are the product of a context and
perspective of values and value judgments. Even if a judgels opinions do not
make "delectable reading," and even if they lack the grand sweep of
largeness of utterance," in Frankfurter's eyes a judge might nevertheless be
deemed great He considered Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite of the United
States Supreme Court a judge deserving of high praise. Notwithstanding
Waite's perceived shortcomings, for Frankfurter the Chief Justice met "one of
the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not to enlarge his authority,' u and
satisfied the "professed role" of judicial self-restraint.
Frankfurter believed that notoriety and influence alone would not be
sufficient to constitute greatness in ajudge, notwithstanding the story told by
Judge Jerome N. Frank of a dispute he had with Frankfurter as to what it
takes to be a "great" judge. The focus of their debate was the seventeenth
century English jurist, Edward Coke, whose record includes his celebrated
confrontation in defense of the common law with the absolutist monarch,
King James L Frank found little good in Chief Justice Coke and believed he
"had retarded English and American legal development for centuries."3
'
Frank reported that Frankfurter disagreed and had argued that "the duration
of [Coke's] influence, no matter whether good or bad, made him a great
judge: ' This seems little more than a point of debate in the setting of
friendly argument. As will be apparent Frankfurter's icons reveal a very
different and higher approach to determining greatness among judges.
Celebrity is insufficient.
sqpra note 23, at 377-78 ("[lIn law also, men make a difference.").
3' Any hesitancy that Frankfite had in identifying greatness in a judge was
compounded when he attempted to identify its sources. For example, Frankfurter rejected
the idea that one could predict greatness in a judicial appointee on the basis of prior
judicial experience because "it would demand complete indifference to the elusive and
intractable factors in tracdng down causes." Frankfurter, Mirror of Justices, supra note
1, at 784, reprinted in 44 A.B.A J. 723, 724 (1958).
When Frankfrter wrote of Brandeis' greatness, he gave an indication of his own
standards. Greatness in a judge would entail "a place in the national consciousness or.
.. an impress on the jurisprudence of the country or merely extend[ing] on the court the
contribution to social thought and action ... made before" taking the bench. Brandeis,
he believed, met all three standards. Frankfuter, The Moral Grandeur ofBrandeis, supra
note 22, reprinted in FRAKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIUE, supra note 19, at 54-55.
FRANKFURTER, szpra note 6, at 80.
" Id. at 81.
34 Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on dudge Learned Hand, 24 U. Cat. L. REV.
666, 666 (1957).
3s id.
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IL JUDGES OF DISTINCTION
Highest on Frankfurter's list of judges of distinction were three
Justices of the United States Supreme Court who are likely candidates for
any such list-Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo.' When Frankfurt-
er wished to explore the judge's task in the enterprise of statutory
construction, he turned to them: "When one wants to understand or at
least get the feeling of great painting, one does not go to books on the art
of painting. One goes to the great masters. And so I have gone to great
masters to get a sense of their practise of the art of interpretation."
37
Chief Justice John Marshall's absence from this list is without special
significance. Frankfurter's list was prepared with an eye to the judicial
task of statutory construction. He saw even Holmes as active in only the
early days of the age of American statutes. Marshall came long before its
dawn.' But when Frankfurter turned his attention to Marshall on his
own terms and times, Frankfurter was at least equally lavish in his praise
of Marshall as jurist Actually, he took his cues from Holmes and, in an
oblique way, Cardozo. In the opening address to a conference at Harvard
Law School in September of 1955, in commemoration of Marshall's birth,
Frankfurter said:
Two hundred years ago a great man was born who indisputably is
the "one alone" to be chosen "if American law were to be represented
by a single figure." John Marshall was the chief architect "of a new
body ofjurisprudence, by which guiding principles are raised above the
reach of statute and State, and judges are entrusted with a solemn and
hitherto unheard-of authority and duty." (Holmes, COLLECrED LEGAL
PAPERS 270 (1920).) Such is the verdict of one whom so qualified a
critic as Mr. Justice Cardozo deemed probably the greatest intellect in
the history of the English-speaking judiciary. 9
3See supra note 1 for Frankuter's longer list of sixteen Supreme Court Justices
drawn from the first seventy-five to serve on the Cort.
Story was high on Frankfurer's personal list. In a foreword to publication of a
rediscovered piece about American law that Story had written for Continental lawyers and
scholars, Frankfurter wrote: "On the roll of truly great American judges, Story
indubitably has a conspicuous place." Frnkfurter, Foreword, AM J. CoMP. L., supra note
23, at 1.
3' Frankfurter, Some Reflections, supra note 23, at 530.
tId.
31Frankfurter, John Marshall, suqra note 22, at 217, reprinted in THAYER, Ho2MES,
AND FLANKPURTER, supra note 22, at 135.
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According to Frankfirter, Marshall held a special place as one of "the main
builders of our nation... [and also held the exclusive and] decisive claim to
... [the] distinction as a great statesman ... as a judge.' 0 Yet Frankfurter
cautioned against giving any judge, including Marshall, '"mythical treatment'
and "godlike qualities." ' For Frankfurter, viewing Marshall as other than
an originator of "transforming thought" was both appropriate and adequate
because such "implies too great a break with the past, implies too much
discontinuity, to be imposed upon society by one who is entrusted with
enforcing its law."42 And for those who would explain Marshall greatness
by noting the excellence of the lawyers who appeared before him, Frankfurter
observed that "[n]ot the least distinction of a great judge is his capacity to
assimilate, to modify, or to reject the discursive and inevitably partisan
argument of even the most persuasive counsel and to transform their raw
material into a judicial judgment."
An even more important caution concerns Frankfurter's sense of Marshall
on what, as will be seen," was critical to Fmnkfiuter in measuring the
greatness of a judge-4he judge stance on the issue of judicial restraint.
Although he believed that "[t]he classic formulation of the judicial duty of
respect for the legislative judgment [was] Marshall', " ' he also thought that
with Marshall "the formula often lost its meaning in application! ' Thus,
Marshall may in fact have held a "special place" in Frankfurter's mind,
although shaded by Frankfurter's disappointment that Marshall did not always
carry his stated principles into practice. Frankfurter would expect a truly great
judge to do so.
When Frankfinter spoke of Justice Holmes, he did so in superlatives. He
saw Holmes as "the most learned and most philosophic-minded of judges."'7
When considering greatness in the Court Chief Justices, Frankfirter referred
to Holmes, who never was Chief Justice, as "that greatest mentality of all,
that greatest intellect, in my judgment, who ever sat on the Court. '" Upon
4 Frankfurter, John Marshall, supra note 22, at 217-18. The "special place" may
indeed have been special to Marshall and his times.
41 Id. at 219.
4 Id. at 220.
Id.; see also FRANKFRTER, supra note 6, at 42-43.44 See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
4s FIANKFMTER, supra note 6, at 82.
4Id. When Frankfurter contrasted Marshall and Chief Justice Waite on this point,
it was clear that Waite fared better and, for that reason, was the greater of the two in
Frankfurter's mind. Id. at 80-82.
'7 Frankfurter, Benjamin N. Cardozo, supra note 23, at 418, reprinted in FRANKMRT-
ER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19, at 185, 187.
4gFrankfiter, Chief Justices IHave Known, supra note 23, at 901. Frankftuter was,
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Holmes' death in 1935, Frankfirter wrote in the Harvard Law Review:
"Nor can there be more doubt about his place in the calendar of
judges. ... [F]or the Supreme Bench he is Marshall's closest compeer,
however unlike their endowment and services.'"49 In his entry on Holmes
in 1944 in the Dictionary of American Biography Frankfurter wrote:
"Probably no man who ever sat on the court was by temperament and
discipline freer from emotional commitments compelling him to translate
his own economic or social views into constitutional commands."'se
Frankfurter's celebration of Holmes was lifelong. His principal objects
of attention were Holmes and the Constitution,5 for he believed that
"the enduring contribution of... Holmes to American history is his
constitutional philosophy."52  Frankfurter's article on Holmes' early
writing in a 1931 issue of the Harvard Law Review in honor of Holmes'
ninetieth birthday 3 encapsulates Frankfurter's sense of the greatness of
Holmes. This sense runs throughout his "Holmes' commentary" over the
years. For Frankfurter, the wellspring of Holmes lay "in the deep
impulses of his own nature. He was born invincibly to ask the meaning
of things and to cut beneath the skin of formulas, however, respect-
able."'M From this followed Holmes' greatness.
Since his mind is scrupulously sceptical, he has escaped sterile
dogma and romantic impressionism. Only the methods of reason,
unsubordinated by ephemeral episodes, can unite coherence with
vitality. To this life of reason he has passionately adhered in responding
of course, not alone in that respect. See, e.g., Frankfinter, October Days, supra note 22
(article commemorating Holmes' ninety-fourth birthday), in Frankfinter Papers, U.S.
i'brary of Congress, Containers 196-97, Reel 124, at 227-28 ("[Iji the judgment of...
Cardozo ... Holmes is probably the greatest name in the history of Anglo-American
law.').
4 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, supa note 21, at 1279.
"Frankfurter, Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 21, at 21, reprinted in FRANK-
FURTER, HOLMES AND TE SUPFRE COURT, supra note 21, at 21; see Frankfinter,
Speech to Brandeis Lawyers, supra note 23, at 53 ("[He] represents the judicial function
at its highest, because, so far as I am concerned, Holmes, more uncompromisingly than
any other Judge, never allowed his personal preferences to enter his decisions.").
" See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, HARV. L. REV., supra
note 23, at 121; Frankfurter, Twenty Years, supra note 23; Frankfurter, Constitutional
Opinions, suipra note 23; Frankfurter, Holmes Defines Constitution, supra note 23,
reprinted in EXTRAIUDICL4 ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 377; Frankfinter, Mr. Justice
Holmes and the Constitution, supra note 23.
2 FRANKFURTER, HoLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 21, at 58.
nFrankfurter, Early Writings of Holmes, supra note 22, at 717.
54 Id. at 721.
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to the most exacting of demand that is made upon judges-to compose
clashing interests of an empire by appeal to law. The philosopher's stone
which Mr. Justice Holmes has constantly employed for arbitrament is
the conviction that our constitutional system rests upon tolerance and
that its greatest enemy is the Absolute."
It was this philosophy, in judicial action, that cemented Holmes' position
in Frankfirter's eyes.
But his skepticism and even hostility, as a matter of private judgment,
toward legislation which he was ready to sustain as a judge only serve
to add cubits to his judicial stature. For he thereby transcended personal
predilections and private notions of social policy, and became truly the
impersonal voice of the Constitution."
The result perceived by Frankfurter was a detached, disinterested, and
unbiased decision maker, one not inclined to substitute personal judgment
for that of .others such as the legislature, and constantly-sometimes
painfully-aware of the absence of simple and absolute answers. For these
qualities, Holmes became Frankfiuter's archetype for judicial greatness.
There was an especially personal backdrop to Frankfurter's view that
Justice Louis D. Brandeis was also a great judge. For years, Brandeis
5' Frankfuter, Early Writings of Holmes, suqra note 22, at 723-24. This is one of
many examples of Frankfurter's pragmatic inclination to 'recycle" his words and ideas:
"Just because his mind is scrupulously skeptical has he been able to escape sterile dogma
and individualistic anarchy." Frankfurter, Book Review, VA. L. REV., sipra note 23, at
743.
Holmes' was not the method of detached reason. Frankfurter wrote:
And Holmes' whole juristic philosophy precluded an attitud of intellectual
isolation for law. Since the essential task of law is "weighing considerations of
social advantage," law as a preoccupation of scientific study is merely a part of
the whole domain of humanistic leaming. "If your subject is law, the roads are
plain to anthropology, the science of man, to political economy, the theory of
legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your final view of life." Thus
spoke Holmes nearly filly years ago. And the extent to which this wisdom is
reflected in the volumes of the United States Reports gives the measure of the
differences between Mr. Justice Holmes and some of his colleagues.
Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (1930) (review of THE
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edwin RA. Seligman ed., 1930)) (footnotes
omitted). Thus, for example, Frankfurter found in Holmes "the wholesome truth that the
final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment" Frankfurter, Some
Reflections, supra note 23, at 531.
56 Frankfurter, Holmes Defines Constitution, szpra note 23, reprinted in ExTrAJUDI-
CIAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 377, 400.
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provided financial backing to then Professor Frankfurter to allow him to
meet expenses without succumbing to the necessity of consulting for the
private bar. This financial assistance afforded Frankfurter the opportunity
to advance projects such as his law school case books.'
Notwithstanding this, Frankfiter did not withhold his personal judgment
on Brandeis' greatness. As will be seen, Frankfurter customarily insisted
on disinterestedness in a judge,s but he apparently imposed no
corresponding test of disqualifying bias to keep him from judging his
mentor, friend, and colleague.59 Thus, in 1941, when Frankfurter spoke
at Brandeis' funeral, he was unstinting in his praise of "the great man"
whose "pursuit of reason and ... love of beauty were Hellenic."
Frankfurter continued in a similar vein later that year when he wrote in
an issue of the Harvard Law Review dedicated "to the memory of Mr.
Justice Brandeis,"'6 and fifteen years later, on the one hundredth
anniversary of Brandeis' birth, when he wrote in the New York Times
Magazine.6
Much of these writings echoed Frankfiuter's views of Brandeis
offered as part of a 1931 issue of the Harvard Law Review in celebration
of Brandeis' seventy-fifth birthday.63 The greatness Frankfurter found in
Justice Brandeis was not unlike that he found in Holmes. Brandeis, too,
exhibited "an instinct for the concrete and... distrust of generalities."
57 NELSON L. DAWSON, Louis D. BRANDEIS, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND THE NEW
DEAL 4-5 (1980); see "HALF BROTHER, HALF SON": THE LETTERS OF Louis D.
BRANDEIS TO FELIx F KFuTEP. (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991) 454
(Letter No. 453 dated Feb. 14, 1931) ("I am glad of the progress on Fed. Jur. and Adm.
Law case books, and am asking Miss Malloch to deposit $500 to your special account to
see you through as suggested.").
"'"If there is one word that Justice Frankfurter uses more than any other, even than
'self-restraint,' it is 'disinterestedness."' HMEN SHIREY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFUT-
ER-SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 348 (1969).
-9 See generally DAwSON, supra note 57 (discussing the close, persomnal, and
professional relationship between Brandeis and Frankfirter and their joint impact upon
the New Deal).
6o Frankfurter, Tribute to Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 21, at A4762 (extension of
remarks of Rep. Thomas H. Eliot).
6! Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, supra note 21, at 181.
2 Frankfurter, The Moral Grandeur of Brandeis, supra note 22, reprinted in
FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIF, supra note 19, at 54.
" Frankfurter, Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 22, at 33 (in honor of
Brandeis' seventy-fifih birthday), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS,
supra note 22, at 49.
'0 Frankfurter, Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 22, at 58, reprinted in
FRANKFURTER, MI. JuSTICE BRANDEIS, supra note 22, at 75.
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Frankfurter saw him as "one who had given ... striking proof of not
being partial to current dogmas." As with Holmes, Frankfurter believed
this to be a consequence of Brandeis' essential skepticism: "Mir. Justice
Brandeis was captive to no dogma. Final truth was the unattainable
bottom of an unfathomable well." "He regarded generalities as traps
for error, and rhetoric as the enemy of wisdom. Problems that seemed
simple to more shallow minds almost oppressed him with their complexi-
ty." These insights were tempered in Brandeis' own humility, which
Frankfurter thought came from his sense of "the limited range of
foresight." Ultimately, Brandeis arrived at a philosophy of judicial
restraint-an awareness that "the duty to abstain from adjudicating ...
may arise from the restricted nature of the judicial process '  and an
understanding that "[t]o forgo judgment under such circumstances is not
an abdication of judicial power, but recognition of rational limits to its
competence."'7 This mirrors much of what Frankfiter saw in Holmes.
Naturally, one who had the capacity for such restraint was also capable
of the disinterest that permitted the separation of personal inclination and
bias from legal judgment.7' The judgment of greatness stood.
There were also special qualities in the relationship between Felix
Frankfurter and Benjamin N. Cardozo. Frankfinter had been married by
Cardozo while the latter was a judge on the New York Court of Appeals,
and in 1939 Frankfurter took Cardozo's place on the United States
Supreme Court.' In Frankfurter's view, Cardozo was "one of the great
- Frankfurter, The Moral Grandeur of Brandeis, supra note 22, reprinted in
FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19, at 54, 56.
Id. at 60. This confirmed what Frankfurter had predicted when Brandeis was
nominated to the Court Brandeis, NEw REPuBuc (Feb. 5, 1916) (unsigned editorial),
reprinted in EXTRAJMICIAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 43, 47 ("We may be perfectly
certain... that Mr. Brandeis is no doctrinaire. He does not allow formulae to do service
for facts.").
6Fankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, supra note 21, at 182.
' Frankfurter, Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 22, at 105 (in honor of
Brandeis' seventy-fiflh birthday), reprinted in FRANKFURTER, MR. JusncE BRANDEIS,
suqpra note 22, at 49.
Frankfurter, Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 22, at 80, reprinted in
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSnCE BRANDEIS, supra note 22, at 49, 98.
7 Id.
7 Taft and the Supreme Court, NEw REPUIC, Oct 27, 1920, Jan. 18, 1922, Jan.
25, 1922 (unsigned editorials), reprinted in ExTRAUDICIAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 49,
51 (defense of Brandeis from criticisms of ex-President and then-Yale law professor
William Howard Taft).
72 LIVA BAKER, FELIX FANURTER 89 (1969).
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judges of our time,"" and as such, "the one man adequate to fill the
historic place vacated by Holmes."'74 Frankfurter considered Cardozo one
of the elite among the elite of Supreme Court Justices. He felt Cardozo's
"enduring significance" that much more remarkable and even "unique"
because Cardozo served on the Court for less than six years."
Frankfurter found special worth in Cardozo on matters of statutory
interpretation. He wrote that his "elucidation of how meaning is drawn
out of a statute gives proof of the wisdom and balance which, combined
with his learning, made him a great judge."76 What Frankfurter believed
Cardozo exhibited, along with Holmes and Brandeis, was the appreciation
that "[a] judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge it nor to
contract it.... He must not read in by way of creation."
Frankfirter found similarly sophisticated restraint in Cardozo's
approach to adjudication generally and constitutional adjudication in
particular. Frankfiter began with the proposition that "the task of
constitutional construction is a function not of mechanics but of
imponderables .... [for which t]here is ... no authorized catalogue
... ; still less is there an accepted organon for striking the balance
among competing and conflicting values."'78 The best and most
imaginative judges were, according to Frankfurter, those who understood
this and also knew "that the ultimate determination of values is not within
the power of formula or measurement ... [and thus] explore[d] to the
uttermost the rational foundations of what they affirm[ed] and what they
reject[ed], in order to avoid confusion between their private universe and
the universe."79 Frankfurter considered Cardozo a judge of this
' Felix Frankfurter, Some Observations on Supreme Court Litigation and Legal
Education, at 5 (Feb. 11, 1953) (manuscript of speech given at the Ernst Freund Lecture
at the University of Chicago) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Litigation and Legal Education],
in Frankfirter Papers, U.S. Library of Congress, Container 199, Reel 125, at 175, 182;
see also Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo, supra note 21, at .638 ("The verdict of history
has already been rendered in counting Cardozo among our great judges, however
restricted the list."); Felix Frankfurter, Nathan Benjamin Cardozo, supra note 21, at 95
(stating that Cardozo was "among our great judges"), reprinted in ExRAwDiCIAL
ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 525.
74 Frankfurter, Cardozo and Public Law, supra note 21, at 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 88,
52 HARV. L. REV. at 440, 48 YALE L. at 458.
71 Frankfurter, Benjamin N. Cardozo, supra note 23, at 418, repinted in FRANKFT-
ER, OF LAW AND Lnm, supra note 19, at 185.
' Frankfinter, Some Reflections, supra note 23, at 532.
77 Id. at 533.
SFrankfurter, Cardozo and Public Law, supra note 21, at 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 89,
52 HARV. L. REV. at 441, 48 YALE. L.J. at 459.
"Id. at 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 90, 52 HARV. L. REV. at 442, 48 YALE. L.J. at 460.
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order.'s Above all, he also found in Cardozo the keys for translating this
philosophy of judging into practice, "the almost automatic exercise of the
two most important faculties called for in a Justice-disinterestedness and
humility.''8
Judge Learned Hand of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
is another whom Frankfurter ranked at the highest level Notwithstanding
the hopes of Holmes and many others, 2 Hand never became a Justice
of the Supreme Court. However, Frankfurter believed that Hand was
appropriately a part of "our national tradition' and belonged to the
"company" of Holmes and Brandeis.' In Hand, Frankfirter found the
disinterestedness so central to his conception of a great judge, that "rare
disinterestedness of mind and purpose, freedom from intellectual and
social parochialism." This frame of mind in a judge was especially
important to Frankfirter because judging, "so dependent on the scientific
spirit of truth-seeking, without the aids of scientific verification, depends
ultimately on those rare men in whom disinterestedness is an intellectual
and moral habit, discernment on inadequate data almost a prophetic
talent.945
Frankffurter was also convinced that "the kind of faculties that are
needed for affairs are more likely to be trained in men brought up in the
law than in any other calling-the ability to see the many-sidedness of
what appear to be simple problems; [and] the ability to give to those
problems the points of view of. the interests of all relevant factors."ss He
" "It is not without significance that the two judges [Holmes and Cardozo] in our
day who have given powerful direction to juristic thinking have done so not by heavy
treatises onjurispnuece," but through essays. Frankfurter, Book Review, U. PA. L. REV.,
supra note 23, at 436. And Cardozo, as Frankfurter saw him, viewed "the judge not as
technician, but as philosopher." Id. at 437.
" Frankfurter, Benjamin N. Cardozo, supra note 23, at 418, reprinted in FRANKFURT-
ER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19, at 185, 188.
2 Frankfurter, Learned Hand, HARV. L. REV., supra note 21, at 3. FrankUrt
actually believed that Hand had been "lucky" and better served by not being appointed
to the Supreme Court Frankfurter, Fifty Years of Service, supra note 22, at 21; see also
Frankfurter, Learned Hand, HAIRV. L. SCH. Y.B., supra note 21, reprinted in FRANKFURT-
ER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19, at 224.
"Felix Frankfurter, The Spirit ofLiberty, N.Y. HERAM TRIBUNE, May 18, 1952, at
§ 6, 1 (reviewing LEARNED HAND, THE SPiRrr OF LBERTY (Irving Dillard ed., 1953))
[hereinafter Frankfurter, The Spirit of Liberty]; see Frankfurter, Judge Learned Hand,
supra note 22, at 325 (recognizing that Cardozo, as well as Holmes and Brandeis, are part
of "our national tradition" in which Hand should be included).
" FrMter, The Spirit of Liberty, supra note 83, at § 6, 1.
Id
16 Felix Frankfurter, The Government Lawer, 18 FED. B.J. 24, 25 (1958).
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believed that those who could resist "the illusory simplicity with which
legal problems are ordinarily stated!' were members of a "select
company,"--along the way they would necessarily encounter, recognize,
and deal with "the interplay of the subjective element in any iudgmentL]
... the objective criteria by which it professes to be guided, ... [and]
the mode of bringing unconscious influences and inarticulate assumptions
to the surface."' Sharing such insights with others was, to Frankfurter,
a high calling and honor
He who persuasively confronts those whose concern is law with the
duty of facing such questions, who does not himself flinch from their
complexity nor from the necessity of seeking answers though recogniz-
ing the elusiveness and impermanence of all answers, joins the company
of the relatively few who build their permanent share in the coral-reef
of the law."
In Frankfurter's eyes, Learned Hand was of this stature. After Hand's
death, Frankfirter wrote of him using the metaphor of the reef:
The individual contribution ofjudges is absorbed in the anonymity
of the coral reef by which the judicial process shapes law. Their name
and fame are writ in water. In the course of a century, the acclaim of
a bare handful survives their day. Learned Hand now joins this most
select company."
Judge Hand warranted such praise because he "liberated bar and bench,
perhaps not less pervasively than Holmes and Cardozo, from the bondage
of jejune categories and question-begging formulas and thereby enabled
them effectively to appreciate that the complexities of life can not be
ruled by unreal simplicities of law."'
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes also ranked high on Frankfurter's
list of great judges. Frankfurter included him on his list of those Justices
7 Felix Frankfurter, Foreward to A Jrispndential Symposium in Memory of FE IX
S. COIE, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 355 (1954) [hereinafter Frankfiuter, Foreward to
A rru&pdentia Symposium].
u Id.; see Frankfurter, Judge Learned Han4, supra note 22, at 327 ("Leaed Hand
knows what he does not know; and he knows the importance of not obstructing deeper
analysis tomorrow by the illusory certainty of obsolete or prematme generalization").
'9 Frankfurter, Foreward to A Jurisprudential Symposium, supra note 87, at 355.
90 Frankfiuter, Learned Hand, HAnv. L. REV., supra note 21, at 4.
9 Id. at 2.
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he considered to be "of distinction in the realm of the mind and spiritf'"
and "pre-eminent" 93 However, his treatment of Hughes is tentative and
veiled in comparison with that of Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo
and Hand. Such tentativeness was perhaps natural in 1930 when Professor
Frankfirter reviewed Hughes' book, The Supreme Court of the United
States: Its Foundation, Methods and Achievements." Hughes had
recently become Chief Justice Hughes, and as Frankfurter saw it, one who
had been more "the narrator of the Court's history ... now [became] the
maker of its history. ' Frankfurter's reserve was hardly characteristic.
Clearly he was marking time while awaiting Hughes' future. However, he
did much the same in a 1941 NBC Radio broadcast honoring Hughes'
retirement.6 Frankfurter stressed that "[t]he verdict of history [would]
not be hurried" and withheld commentary of substance. However, he did
feel free to recognize Hughes' "patience, his complete devotion to duty,
the farsightedness of his wisdom, the twinkle in his eye, the translation
into every day action of his precepts of tolerance and reason and his
bracing good will 9 7
After Hughes' death in 1948, Frankfurter still seemed to refrain from
commentary on the late Chief Justice's substance. What he was willing
to talk of, and typically in glowing terms, was Hughes' running of the
Court. Thus, in 1949 he wrote in the Harvard Law Review of Hughes'
"administrative side."' He had nothing but kind things to say of Hughes
as "an administrator of distinction.!9 As first among the equals of the
Court, "[to see him preside was like witnessing Toscanini lead an
orchestra."1 Frankfurter struck the same themes when he wrote of
Hughes for the 1949 Harvard Law School Yearbook, °' and also when
2 Frankfurter, Mirror of Justices, supra note 1, at 783 reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J. 723,
802 (1958).
3 Frank:frter, Mirror of Justices, supra note 1, at 784, reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J. 723,
802 (1958); see supra note 1.
9 Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 16 A.BA. J. 251 (1930), reprinted in EXRAJDI-
CIAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 206.
" Id. at 252. Frankfinter did, however, discern Hughes' inclination toward judicial
restraint. First and foremost, these lectures leave no doubt that the new Chief Justice
realizes that the effectiveness of the Court's work does not derive from any language of
the Constitution or the compulsions of logic or the mechanical contrivances of its
organization. It depends upon the self-denying ordinances of the Justices." Id. at 208.
' Remarks of Justice Frankfurter, supra note 20.
97Id.
" Frankfurter, Chief Justice Hughes, spra note 21, at 1.
9 Id. at 4.
1. Frankfirter, Chief Justices I Have Known, supra note 23, at 901.
... Frankfurter, 1949 Harvard Law School Yearbook, supra note 21.
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he reviewed Hughes' official biography for the New York Times.' 2 Not
surprisingly, for one he rated so highly °3  Frankfrter also noted
Hughes' disinterestedness."' Still, Frankfurter made no serious attempt
at engaging Hughes' work as jurist. Consequently, Frankfurter's ratings of
Hughes' greatness are ratings with a marked difference.
What this may mean is that Frankfirter was willing to alter his terms
for greatness in this special case. That he said so little of Hughes as judge
seems unusual unless he indeed had less to say in superlative terms.
Nonetheless, Frankfurter might have deemed a judge worthy of greatness
for other reasons. For example, in the 1930s Hughes had shown great
resourcefulness and skill in presiding over an often divided and conten-
tious Court in an era of transition. Hughes had seen the Court successful-
ly through the perilous times of President Roosevelt's "court-packing"
scheme, performing the sort of task that an administrator might perform
with distinction. Hughes had done so, and Frankfurter was fully
appreciative.
Another judge clearly in Frankfirter's favor was Chief Judge Calvert
Magruder of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, with
whom Frankfurter had a longstanding relationship. Upon Frankfurter's
recommendation, Magruder was Brandeis' first law clerk and, in Brandeis'
view, his best. Frankfurter recommended Magruder on "a hunch," thus
proving the proposition that "the art of life ... is accurate guessing on
inadequate data." ' 5 For Frankfurter, Magruder's special strength was his
Frankfurter, Charles Evans Hughes, supra note 23, reprinted in EXTRAIUICIAL
ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 465.
" "I should say the three greatest Chief Justices we've had were John Marshall,
Roger Taney, and Charles E. Hughes." Frankfurter, ChiefJustices IHave Known, supra
note 23, at 885.
104 Frankfurter, Charles Evans Hughes, supra note 23, reprinted in EXTRAJUDICIAL
ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 469. Frankfurter also observed: "No Chief Justice, I believe,
equalled Chief Justice Hughes in the skill and the wisdom and the disinterestedness with
which he made his assignments." Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, supra note
23, at 904. Frankfurter thought that disinterestedness was especially important and even
"indispensable" in Justices of the Supreme Court because of the reach of the Court's
powers and responsibilities "to seize the permanent, more or less, from the feelings and
fluctuations of the transient." Frankfurter, Mirror of Justices, supra note 1, at 793,
reprinted In 44 A.B.A. J. 723, 802 (1958). Furthermore, he considered it imperative that
judges put aside personal ambitions, particularly those political in nature, with the object
of avoiding even the appearance of bias. Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions, supra note 1,
at 658.
"'oMagruder, HARV. L. REv., supra note 20, at 1201. This piece was an introduction
to a forum of lead articles on Magruder and in "t bute ' to Magruder upon his retirement
from the bench. See Editors' Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. vii (1959).
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successful combination of potentially antagonistic opposites. In Magruder
Fmnkfirter found the realization "that form and substance in legal opinions
are not opposite or alien ingredients but constitute a fused whole."'
Similarly, but on the personal side, Fmnkfurter noted, "Still less is there a
separation in him between the judge and the man.' 7 In this Frankfurter
meant that Magmder' virtues as an individual infused the man, as a judge,
and did so in positive ways to the benefit of all. Consequently, Magruders
tendencies toward personal modesty made him modest on the bench, with the
result that Magruder presented himself as "a true disciple of [Oliver Wendell
Holmes] deepest conviction that the first duty of a judge is to remember that
he is not God.'s8 Or as Frankfurter put it, "While no one could have a
higher regard for the office of judge, [Magruder] does not confuse the
occupant with the office."' ° From this it followed that "[h]is opinions
irradiate[d] what may fairly be called moral qualities, particularly candor and
complete absence of pretense in all its manifestations, from stuffiness to
spurious learning."" Magruder's qualities made Frankfurter "dominantly
aware of humility as perhaps the prime judicial requisite."''
Finally, Frankfurter looked upon Magruder as anything but an example
of "the slot-machine theory of adjudication which holds that one can find an
answer for every legal problem in the law reports, or even in the best of legal
writings, or by means of merely syllogistic reasoning. Cardozol admirable
discussion of the creative aspect ofajudget work did not come to Magruder
as revelation."' In what he tells us Magruder was not, one sees what
Frankfiter believed a judge should be.
A judge need not be nationally prominent to qualify for greatness in
Frankfurters eyes. Less well-known persons serving on less well-known
Although Magruder did not take any of Frankfirter's courses while a student at
Harvard, Frankfirter "selected him as the first clerk to Mr. Justice Brandeis." Magruder,
HARV. L. SCH. Y.B., supra note 20, reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra
note 19, at 136. Brandeis' respect for Magruder's critical judgment was such that he said-
"Among all my law clerks Magruder was the best critic I had." Id. at 1201. Magruder
later taught at Harvard, and continued to teach while on the bench. Magruder, HARV. L.
ScH. Y.B., supra note 20, reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19,
at 136.
Magruder, HARV. L. SCH. Y.B., lqra note 20, reprinted in FRANKFURTER, OF
LAW AND LIFE, supra note 19, at 137.
107 Id. at 138.
109 Id.
'0 Magruder, HARV. L. REV., supra note 20, at 1202.
"0 Id. at 1203.
"' Id. at 1202.
llr d.
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benches might qualify. As was so often seen, Frankfurter placed special
worth in an independent judiciary. "[T]he judge, if he is worth his salt,
must be above the battle. We must assume in him not only personal
impartiality but intellectual disinterestedness." When an individual
placed that value above personal goals, Frankfurter was ready and quick
in his praise. In 1956 Judge Reuben Oppenheimer stood for reelection to
the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City and was returned to a full fifteen-
year term by "the largest total of votes secured by any of the candi-
dates."" 4 What caught Frankfurter's eye and led him to write about
Oppenheimer, notwithstanding his sensitivity to the need that "a member
of the Supreme Court should keep scrupulously aloof from politics,""' 5
was the nature of Judge Oppenheimer's campaign.
Not long before the 1956 election, Oppenheimer had been persuaded
to accept a short appointment to the bench by Maryland's governor,
Theodore McKeldin. When he agreed to run in his own right,
Judge Oppenheimer refused to make any campaign speeches, to
make any contributions or to do anything except to say that if the
people wanted him he would serve. To emphasize this, immediately
after the primary he took off for Europe and stayed there for two
months. The people vindicated this appropriately austere attitude in an
emphatic way.
6
For this, Frankfurter praised the public and its recognition of "the
indispensable need in a democracy of a completely disinterested
judiciary.""
mII. OBLIGATION AND CRMCISM
Other of Frankfurter's commentaries, memorials and assorted
testimonials about individual judges are more qualified in presentation
. Frankfurter, Some Reflections, supra note 23, at 529, reprinted from 2 Record of
the Ass'n of the B of the City of N.Y. 213 (1947) (Sixth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture delivered March 18, 1947).
114Felix Frankfurter, Letter to the Editor (Nov. 12, 1956), N.Y. TIMS, Nov. 14, 1956,
at 34.
115 Id.
116 1d.
117 Id. Frankfurter noted that this was not a recently acquired appreciation in this
country. As evidence, he pointed to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and its call
for 'judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit." Id.
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and conclusion. Some seem the product of obligation, shaped by little (or
sometimes too much) knowledge of the subject. Typically the thrust and
tenor of the commentary are muted, no doubt out of respect for the
individual, the occasion, and the office. 8 Such commentaries provide
one with reinforcement for what Frankfirter believes a great judge should
and must be, and often glimpses of his sense of the antithesis of
greatness. On occasions of aggravated and egregious circumstance,
Frankfirter drops all inclination toward pretense. The resulting criticism
can be scathing.
Frankfurter's tributes to his colleague, Justice Robert H. Jackson,
seem more the product of obligation than approbation. In the year
following his death in October of 1954, Jackson was remembered in
issues of both the Harvard and Columbia law reviews, and Frankfurter
contributed to both."9 The two Justices had not been kindred judicial
spirits. By Frankfirter's admission they had not seen 'tiings with a
common eye.""12 Frankfurter did, however, return to the theme of the
imperative of a disinterested judiciary--the Supreme Court as the ultimate
voice ... must always be humbly mindful of the fact that it is entrusted
with power which is saved from misuse only by a self-searching
disinterestedness almost beyond the lot of men,"'' and he found this
virtue in Jackson.m Yet, ultimately, his comments concerning Jackson
reveal faint criticism and even fainter praise. In opinion-writing, Jackson
"belonged to what might be called the naturalistic school He wrote as he
talked, and he talked as he felt."'" It is certain that Frankfurter saw
limitation and risk in the way Jackson felt. He considered Jackson
.. Compare Letter to Chief Justice Robert B. Williamson, supra note 21, at 534
('With the possible exception of Mr. Justice Cardozo, I do not think I ever knew a lawyer
who was more deeply soaked in the traditions of the common law or cared more for its
continuing potential values for Western civilization.... I am not qualified to speak of
Ned's services as Chief Justice of your State .... .') with Letter to Chief Judge Simon E.
Sobeloff, supra note 21, at 13 ("I ought not to make any comment on Annistead as a
judge, for no man should pass judgment on a fellow judge without having read the whole
corpus of his opinions. ... He was a devoted and generous friend and a kindly spirit,
wholly apart from the fact that by his wit and interstitial wisdom he lightened the burdens
of many of us.").
"9 Frankfurter, Foreword, CoLUM. L. REV., supra note 21, at 435; Frankfurter, Mr.
Justce Jaclon, supra note 21, at 937.
Frankfurter noted that they were opposed to one another in the cases in which
Jackson wrote his first and last opinions as a Supreme Court justice. Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Jackson, supra note 21, at 937.
1 Id. at 938.
'Id.
id.
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"specially endowed as an advocate" and observed that as a judge, "his
aims increasingly groped beyond that of mere advocacy."'" By Frank-
furter's lights, this tendency in Jackson was compounded by, and the
product of, Jackson's years in practice. Correcting the tendency was made
that much more difficult by the "meager systematic legal training ... [of
this] self-educated man and ... self-taught lawyer."' As Frankfurter
observed:
His wide reading helped to counteract the powerful impact of the
immediate and the concrete, natural enough in one so thoroughly
immersed for so long in practice. Undue regard for the so-called
practical leaves out of account the fact that a generalization based on it
too often works injustice to the practical needs of the future."
Here Frankfirter revealed a classic, almost stereotypical academic's bias
in favor of the necessity of the training which he believes that only he
can provide, and his own bias against the practical fruits of life in the so-
called real world. For Frankfirter, the ideal judge can have too little of
the former and too much of the latter. 7
Frankfurter's 1946 memorial to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in
the Yearbook of the American Philosophical Society is not quite as
hesitant in its praise. Unlike Jackson, Stone had been a law professor and
dean of Columbia University School of Law." This may have, in
whole or in part, provided a measure of the tutored grace Frankfirter
found wanting in Jackson.' Frankfiurter's piece, however, contains
none of the ringing celebration of his commentary on those that he
'4 Id. at 939.
12- Frankfinter, Foreword, COLUM. L. REv., supra note 21, at 437.
126 Id.
'2 Frankfirter disclosed these inclinations on other occasions as well. For example,
in expressing his preference for the university-educated lawyer Frankfinter attempted to
withdraw the sting of his contention and, in the process, drove it home:
This is not because in the universities men are more honorable, more useful,
than anybody else who does an honorable and useful piece of work; but because
in the distribution of different functions in an advanced society they are charged
with the special task of disinterested inquiry. They are charged with the duty
of looking beyond the moment ....
Frankfurter, Litigation and Legal Eduwation, supra note 73, at 20, in Frankfirter Papers,
U.S. Iabrary of Congress, Container 199, Reel 125, at 175, 197.
12 See ALPHEUs T. MASON, HARiAN F= STONE: PILAR OF THE LAW 77-82
(1956).
Frankfurer, Harlan Fiske ,Stone, supra note 21, at 336.
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considered great. Frankfirter notes that Stone was not a philosopher, as
Holmes had been. He then observes that it is difficult to be a philosopher
if one is spending time, as Stone did, as "teacher, practitioner, administra-
tor, [and] judge.""' Frankfurter concludes: "He had a strong historic
sense and naturally enough was concerned with his place in history. Chief
Justices of the United States are rarer than Presidents. A Chief Justice
cannot escape history.'' However, Frankfurter himself escapes telling
what he believes Stone's place might be. Along the way, and by way of
contrasts, he perhaps tells us much.
When Frankfiter memorialized Justice Owen J. Roberts in the pages
of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1955," his purpose
was not to explore the contours of greatness. By Roberts' own admission,
he had no pretensions of that sort: "'Ihave no illusions about my judicial
career. But one can only do what one can. Who am I to revile the good
God that he did not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes,
a Brandeis or a Cardozo.""'  Although Frankfurter thought "Roberts
was unjust to himselt' ' 1 what he found best in Roberts was his
decency: "[No man ever served on the Supreme Court with more
scrupulous regard for its moral demands than Mr. Justice Roberts.' 35
Instead of lionizing Roberts, Frankfurter's specific purpose was to correct
the record on the celebrated matter of "Roberts' Switch," in which
Roberts was seen as having voted on one side of an issue, only to switch
to the other months later, and all for reasons of politics rather than
principle." Frankfurter himself had contributed to this view of Rob-
erts,"7 and he wrote to square things with Roberts, history, and, not
unimportantly, himself.
Another piece of the record demonstrating that nothing was more
important in Frankfurter's eyes than an absence of bias is a 1957
'
30 Id. at 335.
"' Id. at 340.
I Frankfter, Mr. Jisrt'ce Roberts, supra note 21, at 311.
Id. at 312 (quoting Roberts' remarks upon leaving the Supreme Court).
mId.
'3 Id. at 317.
m Id. at 313-17. The "switch" concerned Roberts' vote withthe majority inMorehead
v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941), in which Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating
New York's minimum wage law) was reaffirmed, and his vote with the majority the
following year in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which Adklns
was overnuled.
'3 ROOSEVELT AND F RANxFTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, supra note
7, at 392-95.
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memorial in the University of Chicago Law Review to Judge Jerome N.
Frank of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."
The memorial illustrates that Frankfurter was quite willing to look
beneath a harsh and seemingly rigid exterior to see whether a judge
passed his test. Frankfurter wrote:
While he somehow managed to envelop himself in an atmosphere of
dogmatism, he was singularly free of bias or imprisoning doctrine. His
seeming iconoclasm was rooted in his zealous loyalty to the realization
that the history of thought, particularly sociological thought, is the
history of continuous replacement of erroneous dogma. 39
Frankfurter struck a similar note in a 1957 piece for the Cornell Law
Quarterly celebrating Judge Henry W. Edgerton's twentieth year on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."
Although Judge Edgerton did not seem to share Judge Frank's sharp
edges, they did have in common the detachment that Justice Frankfurter
so prized. Frankfurter wrote:
I venture to believe that the qualities which should be sought for in
members of the Supreme Court are not less requisite for the court which
Henry W. Edgerton graces. The first requisite is disinterestedness; the
second requisite is disinterestedness; the third is disinterestedness. This
means, in short, the habit of self-discipline so inured that merely
personal views orpassions are effectively antisepticized and thereby bar
a corrosion of judgment leading to arbitrary determinations.'
Frankfurter's reach in praise of judges was not unlimited. His respect
for the judiciary and the judicial office was a matter of critical discern-
ment. When he saw fit, his scorn could be unbounded." On September
5, 1932, in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Frankfurter wrote
of Justice Ellis J. Staley of the Supreme Court of New York.
'3' FrankfrMer, Jerome N. Frank, supra note 21, at 625.
139 Id.
'4' Frankfurter, Judge Henry W. Edgerton, supra note 22, at 161.
14! Id. at 162.
142 His scon could also be undisclosed. In a series of unsigned editorials in New
Republic he challenged the judicial philosophy of ex-President William Howard Taft
while Taft was a Yale law professor and, later, when Taft became Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court Taft and the Supreme Court, supra note 71, reprinted in ExTRAJUDICLAL
ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 49. Frankfarter's principal challenge was to that species of
judicial activism, substantive due process, that allowed judges to strike down legislation.
Id.
[Vol 82
9MR. JUSTInCE FRANKFURTER
The opinion of Justice Staley will long endure as a shining example of what
anopinion shouldnotbe. Aflerreaching the inescapable decisionthathe had
no judicial power over the Governor, the justice officiously assumed the role
of private counsel to the Mayor. After paying lip service to the principle of
the separation of powers, Justice Staley violated the most deeply rooted
requirement of that constitutional doctrine whereby judges should confine
themselves to adjudication and, above all, abstain from participation in
political controversies outside their jurisdiction.
... To indulge inthe criticism of Governor Roosevelt which Justice Staley
expressed was not only a flagrant abuse of judicial power. It violated the
rudimentary canon against pronouncing views on ex parte statements. 43
The controversy which drew Frankfurter ire involved the trio of Governor
Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, Mayor James J. Walker of New York
City, and Justice Staley. At issue was Roosevelts initiation of a proceeding
to remove Walker from office. The charge was financial misdeeds and corupt
practices. The mayor attempted to stop Roosevelt by seeking a writ of
prohibition from the court" Staley denied the mayor petition.' 45
The judge' error was not in his ultimate finding. Staley denied the writ
on the ground that the governor was within his powers in seeking to remove
the mayor and was subject only to his own conscience and the will of the
public. But the judge did not stop with that He went on to critique the
fairness of the removal proceeding, finding both Roosevelt and his procedures
wanting in that respect'" This stirred Frankfurter to write his letter.147
1 Felix Frankfiuter, Letter to the Editor (Sept. 5, 1932), N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1932,
at 18.
144 Court Limits Issue to Charter Section, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1932, at 6.
... Text of Court's Decision in Walker Removal Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1932, at
2.
146 Id.
14 Frankfurter's attack on Staley probably involved more than an abstract defense of
proper judicial behavior. Earlier in the summer of 1932, Roosevelt had been nominated
by the Democratic party as its candidate for the Presidency. What Frankfurter considered
ex parte, partisan and dicta would also have carried a danger of political risk to
Roosevelt This easily could have brought Frankfurter to the defense of his friend,
Roosevelt
A week later the Times carried a letter in defense of Staley in the face of
Frankfurter's attack The writer pointed out that in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall devoted considerable attention to the illegality
of Secretary of State Madison's refusal to issue Marbury's commission as justice of the
peace, only to moot his own commentary by declaring the statute in question unconstitu-
tional The writer concluded- "Apparently Judge Staley, despite the severe castigation
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As he saw it; the judge became a partisan. The judge gratuitous commentary
was, in any event, of little consequence; Mayor Walker resigned on
September 1, 1932.1"
Fmnkfurtert criticism of Justice Staley, striking in its intensity, was not
unique. There were other occasions when he conveyed extreme displeasure
with individual judges. Such was the case later in 1932 when he criticized the
actions of Judge Martin T. Manton, senior judge of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. Judge Manton had invoked his supervisory power as senior
circuit judge with respect to the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Using that power, Manton determined that it was in "the public
interest' to appoint himself to the position of temporary district court
judge. His presence as district judge destroyed the otherwise unanimous views
of the district bench on the timely and pressing matter of appointment of
receivers in equity, especially in bankruptcy cases. Judge Manton thereupon
took advantage of this newfound discord on the district bench to exercise
another of his powers as circuit judge, namely, the power to assign cases
among district judges when they were unable to agree among themselves. He
then ordered that applications for appointment of receivers should be
presented to him as temporary district judge. In this manner Circuit Judge
Manton assigned tasks to District Judge Manton, instead of to others on the
district bench. The effect was that Manton took over the task of appointment
of receivers for the financially desperate Interborough Rapid Transit
Company.'
50
The Editor of the New York 2imes received word from Cambridge that
Professor Fmankfiuter was displeased: "Bad Judge Manton appointed the
Angel Gabriel himself fundamental questions affecting the orderly
administration of justice and the public's respect for the Federal courts would
be raised.' ' In this instance the effect, according to Fmnkfinter, was even
more corrosive to "the maintenance of unimpaired confidence in the integrity
and high traditions of the Federal judiciary, ... [it was an] abusive exercise
of judicial authority."'' 2 What Frankifrter feared was that formalistic
which his opinion in the Walker case has suffered at the hands of Professor Frnkfrter,
had respectable precedent for his course." Robert E. Whalen, Letter to the Editor (Sept.
7, 1932), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1932, at 20.
"4 Walker Resigns, Denouncing the Governor; Says He Will Run For the Mayoralty
Again, Appealing to "Fair Judgment" of the People, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 2, 1932, at 1.
14. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 61 F.2d 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1932), afd, 289 U.S.
479 (1933).
1"0 Felix Frankfurter, Letter to the Editor (Oct. 4, 1932), N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1932,
at 18; see Manhattan Ry. Co., 61 F.2d at 935-37.
... Frankfurter, supra note 150, at 18.
n Id.
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manipulation of a court's jurisdiction and powers was an invitation to
legislative correction. Frankfurter thought Manton's "abusive exercise of
judicial authority" carried that risk and, in the process, disserved the
Federal judiciary.' What Judge Manton fell short of was what
Frankfurter considered "one of the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not
to enlarge his authority."
154
Actually, Manton claimed to have a purpose other than personal
aggrandizement: he said he was trying to deal with the district court's
practice, which he opposed, of appointing the Irving Trust Company as
receiver in all equity and bankruptcy cases that came before it. According
to Manton, the machinations criticized by Frankfurter were intended to
change this practice through the appointment of individual receivers
rather than a single, corporate one. 55 The Federal Bar Association in
the New York area appears to have agreed. At the time it "heartily
commended" Manton's effort to break Irving Trust's court-sponsored
monopoly."
In addition to his letter to the Times on the matter, Frankfurter also
authored an unsigned editorial that appeared in New Republic in July of
1933."s The New Republic editorial provides a fuller understanding of
the basis for Frankfirter's intense reactions to Manton's role in this case
and suggests that more was involved than a federal judge's overreaching.
In the editorial, Frankfurter pointed out that this occasion, which
eventually involved the Supreme Court of the United States, was not the
first of Manton's troubles with the Court involving Interborough. In a
1928 dispute over a fare increase, Manton had sided with Interborough
only to have the Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals' injunction
prohibiting state or local interference with the increase." Frankfurter
also drew attention to Manton's role in litigation concerning 'the reason-
ableness of bonuses received by executives of the American Tobacco
Company. He stressed how supportive Judge Manton had been of
company management, as compared to the Supreme Court."
153 Id.
'm FPRA TE., supra note 6, at 80. Frankfirte made this observation in praise of
Chief Justice Waite of the United. States Supreme Court, who Frankfurter believed
'Vrefminenfly belongs to the tradition of judicial self-restraint" Id. at 81.
. Manton Defends His Action on IRT., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1932, at 2.
.. Bar Group Citicizes Receiver "Monopoly", N.Y. TMES, Sept. 23, 1932, at 2.
1 7Judge Manton and the Supreme Cowt, NEW REPUBUIC (July 19, 1933) (unsigned
editorial), reprinted In ExURAWdAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 306.
" Id. at 306-07; see Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159
(1929), rev'g 26 F.2d 912 (S.D.Y. 1928).
1. Judge Manton and the Swqeme Cow, supra note 157, reprinted in EnmAJUDI-
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Frankfurter saw all of this as prologue to the present "judicial shenani-
gan,' '  which he suggested involved "the disposition of judicial patron-
age.
' 161
The controversy surrounding Mantont role took a long and tortured path
in the courts. Manton lost and won, was sustained and roundly criticized, '
and eventually found himselfunder Justice Stone1 order to go no fither until
all questions were resolved concerning his continued involvement in the
proceeding. 63 Eventually, in October of 1933, Judge Manton retired from
the Interborough proceeding'" He indicated his need to return to his circuit
court duties, as the "busy season!' was about to begin. 65
It seems, however, that nothing with Manton was quite what it might
have seemed. Fiankfurtert mention of the tobacco bonuses in the New
Republic editorial seemed, on its face, somewhat out of context and off the
mark of the Interborough controversy, but perhaps it was not. Manton was
later convicted of accepting a bribe from the tobacco company in the shape
of loans never repaid.'" Thus, at the heart of Fmnkfurtert objection was
not simply a wayward judge, but a crooked one. To one such as Frankfurter
whose philosophy of judging recommended disinterest, devoid of intangible
personal bias and disqualifying prejudgment, Manton was ultimately guilty
of the ultimate sin: tangible interest of the venal sort. This was the icon
inverted.
CONCLUSION
The result of Frankfurter's iconography of judging is the celebration of
the few, the acceptance of many, and the castigation of another small few.
Along the way, two broad requisites for greatness in a judge take form."
CIAL ESSAYS, sqra note 19, at 306, 307; compare Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 60 F.2d
114 (2d Cir. 1932) with Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (reversing
the lower court decision).
'6' Judge Manton and the Sqpreme Cowl, supra note 157, reprinted in EXMAJUDI-
CIAL ESSAYS, supra note 19, at 309.
I" d. at 308.
16 Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 61 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), rev'g 1 F. Supp. 809
(S.D.N.Y. 1932) and afd, 289 U.S. 479 (1933); Ex parte Relnar Holding Co., 61 F.2d
941 (2d Cir. 1932), rev'g 1 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y.) and cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614
(1933).
63 Order in LRT Case Restrains Manton, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1933, at 1.
16 Manton Retires From LRT Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 1, 1933, at 7.
' 3Mark Succeeds Manton, N.Y. TmES, Oct. 3, 1933, at 3.
1 6See GEORGE T. WASEINGTON & V. HENRY ROTRS=D, 2 COMPENSATING THE
CORPORATE EXECUnIVE 884 n.37 (3d ed. 1962).
167 Although not prominent in Frankfurer's iconography, two factors that he also
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First, and never far from Frankft-er's mind, was his sense of
limitation upon judicial powers. The origins of his mindset were in the
late-nineteenth century thoughts of Professor James Bradley Thayer of
Harvard Law School. Thayer influenced Frankfurter directly,'68 as well
as indirectly through his impact on Frankfurter's icons, Holmes and
Brandeis. 9 Thayer's view of the role of the judiciary in constitutional
adjudication was that the courts "can only disregard the Act [of the
legislature] when those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one-so clear that it is not
open to rational question."'7 Frankfirter took his cue from Thayer. His
commitment to judicial restraint was firm and gave Frankfurter his place,
noted were the matters of judicial appearance and presence. Sometimes in seriousness,
and on other occasions with that humor which carries its own serious truth, the diminutive
Frankfurter noted and seemed to place value upon a judge's appearance and demeanor.
Thus, he observed of Chief Justice Edward D. White: 'here was something very
impressive about him, both in appearance and otherwise. He was an impressive-looking
person'" Frankfiter, Chief Justices I Have Known, supra note 23, at 896. "He looked
the way a Justice of the Supreme Court should look .... He was tall and powerful."
Id. at 892. Such statements were consistent with his generality that "[flor myself, I think
all Justices of the Supreme Court should be strong, big, powerful-looking men!" Id. at
887.
'a On one occasion, Frankfurter opined:
[I]f I were to name one piece of writing on American constitutional law... I
would pick ... Thayer['s] ... "vThe Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law" .... Why would I do that? Because from my point of
view it's the great guide for judges and therefore, the great guide for under-
standing by non-judges of what the place of the judiciary is in relation to
constitutional questions.
FELIX FRAN mFmTEa REMNiSCES 299-300 (1960) (recorded in talks with Dr. Harlan B.
Phillips); see also JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HuGo BLACK, FELIX FRANK-
FURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 33 (1989) ("qtayer's thesis became
Frankfiuter's judicial credo: that judges must exercise restraint in their decisions, mindful
of the strength and wisdom of the popularly elected legislators who passed the laws the
jurists inftrpret. .
'6 See generally HIMSCH, supra note 6, at 128-32 (discussing Frankfurer's perception
of himself as within the tradition of Thayer, Holmes and Brandeis on matters of judicial
restraint); Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of
Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1978); see also Sanford V.
Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REv. 430 (1973)
(discussing Frankfurter's sense of America and the American presidency as a contributing
factor in his philosophy that judicial restraint was wan-anted because he believed that an
activist and vigilant Court was unnecessary).
'70 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
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along with Thayer, Holmes, and Judge Learned Hand, among "the
outstanding jurisprudential voices in defense of the doctrine."'17  This
thread runs common among those whom Frankfurter held highest.
An expansionary and imperial judiciary was not Frankfurter's ideal.
As Frankfiter observed, "If judges want to be preachers, they should
dedicate themselves to the pulpit; if judges want to be primary shapers of
policy, the legislature is their place. Self-willed judges are the least
defensible offenders against government under law."'" Should anyone
have "the impression that a Justice of the Court is left at large to exercise
his private wisdom, let me [Frankfurter] hasten to say as quickly as I can
that no one could possibly be more hostile to such a notion than I
am.' ' 3 He thought these limitations especially relevant for Justices of
the United States Supreme Court because the sort of case they consider
"leaves more scope for insight, imagination, and prophetic responsibility
than the types of litigation that come before other courts.l''  Important-
ly, Frankfurter's restraint was far from mindless ritualism.1
75
Second, and equally important for Frankfurter, was the judge's
disinterestedness. As Helen Shirley Thomas noted, "If there is one word
that Justice Frankfirter uses more than any other, even than 'self-
restraint,' it is 'disinterestedness."' 7 Without it, the opportunities for
171 THAYER, HOLMES, AD FRANKFURTER, supra note 22, at v; see also PHUP B.
KURIAND, MR. JusuicE FRANKFuRTEm AND THE CoNsTurON 5-15 (1971) (discussing
judicial restraint evidenced in Frankfurter's Supreme Court opinions).
1
2 Frankfirer, John Marshall, supra note 22, at 238, reprinted in THAYER, HOLMES,
AND FRANKFUTER, supra note 22, at 135; see DAWSON, supra note 57, at 27.
17 Frankfurter, Mirror of Juhices, supra note 1, at 794, reprinted in 44 A.BA.J. 723,
803 (1958).
14 Id.
1 See, for example, Erwin N. Griswold, Felix Frati9wler-Teacher of the Law, 76
HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1962):
His teaching has been of the integrity of the judicial process, of the essential
importance of sound procedures, ofjudicial self-restrain, and of the intellectual
humility of the judge. In this, I venture to say, he has come closer to verity than
any other judge of our time or most judges in history. It is futile-and is to miss
the point of his influence and thought-4o talk of him as 'liberar' or "conserva-
tive." Such labels are quite irrelevant to ajudge of Frankfurter's orientation and
depth of thought.
But see HIRsCH, mpra note 6, at 191 ("By maldng a total commitment to Thayer's
philosophy of deference and by using that commitment as his principal philosophic shield
against his opponents, Frankfurter lost whatever chance he might have had to work out
the contradictions in his own beliefs.").
116 THOMAS, supra note 58, at 348.
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greatness, in Frankfurter's view, were remote. In 1953 Justice Frankfurter
talked informally at the University of Virginia School of Law about Chief
Justices of the United States Supreme Court whom he had known, and
also discussed a few whom he had not known."7 In his concluding
comments he spoke broadly of what he believed to be desirable in a
Justice of the Supreme Court Much of what he said is relevant to anyone
serving in any judicial capacity.
[What you want in a Justice is not a specialist in this or that field, not
necessarily a man who has prior experience on the bench, not necessari-
ly a man who has been broadened by high office .... What is essential
for the discharge of functions that are almost too much, I think, for any
nine mortal men, but have to be discharged by nine fallible creatures,
what is essential is that you get men who bring to their task, first and
foremost, humility and an understanding of the range of problems and
of their own inadequacy in dealing with them; disinterestedness,
allegiance to nothing except the search, amid tangled words, amid
limited insights, loyalty and allegiance to nothing except the effort to
find their path through precedent through policy, through history,
through their own gifts of insight to the best judgment that poor fallible
creatures can arrive at in that most difficult of all tasks, the adjudication
between man and man, between man and state, through reason called
law.
7
7Frnkfir, ChlefJu.hices IHave Known, smpra note 23, at 883.
"'Id. at 905. Furthermore, the loftier the bench, the more demanding the judge's tasks
might prove. Frankfurter believed that "true humility and its offspring, disinterestedness,
are more indispensable for the work of the Supreme Court than for a judge's function on
any other bench." Felix Frankfurter, Some Observations On the Nature of the Judicial
Process of Supreme Court Litigation, Address Before the American Phil6sophical Society,
at 14 (April 22, 1954) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Address Before the American Philosophi-
cal Society], in Frankfurter Papers, U.S. Library of Congress, Container 197, Reel 125,
at 300, 314.
As to prior judicial experience, Justice Frankfirter stated that it 'is neither a
qualification nor a disqualification." Frankfiter, Chief Justices IHave Known, sipra note
23, at 887. That "the correlation between prior judicial experience and fitness for the
functions of the Supreme Court is zero" was Frankfurter's principal theme in 1957 inthe
first Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
Frankfiter, Mirror of Justices, supra note 1, at 795, reprinted in 44 A.BA. J. 723, 803
(1958). Indeed, he intimated that prior service on a state court might be undesirable
because of the habits of 'temperamental partismhip and ambition" that many state judges
developed. Id. at 787. He also thought that "geographic considerations" and "political
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Even for one armed with disinterest and a sense ofjudicial limitation,
this calling could not be lightly or readily undertaken. A year later in an
address to the American Philosophical Society, he once more spoke of the
Supreme Court, yet of matters which at least in part pertain to all judges:
A judge ... should be compounded of the faculties that are
demanded of the historian and the philosopher and the prophet. The last
demanded upon him-to make some forecast of the consequences of his
action-is perhaps the heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the future, to
give shape and visage to mysteries still in the womb of time, is the gift
of imagination. It requires poetic sensibilities with which judges are
rarely endowed and which their education does not normally develop.
These judges ... must have something of the creative artist in them;
they must have antennae registering feeling and judgment beyond
logical, let alone, quantitative proof.
1 7.9
These dimensions of judging would be difficult, if not impossible, to
teach or learn. They are more likely to be inherited with the wind.
As for Frankfurter himself, would he have considered himself worthy
of a place in his own highest ranks, by his own standards? It seems clear
that he aspired to, and hoped for, greatness by his own terms. But it
seems unlikely that he would have accepted a place with Marshall,
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and the like, had it been offered.... At the
same time, his record suggests that he was consistent in his own
affiliations" were irrelevant Id. at 795-96. All of this bore the risk of self-serving.
" 'Frankfurter, Address Before the American Philosophical Society, supra note 178,
at 11. In these themes Frankfiter draws upon strains previously evoked by Justice
Cardozo. See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo, sWa note 21, at 638-39. Frankflrter had
no expectation that a Cardozo, or anyone else, could mark a path to certainty. "Whenever
Frankfurter was asked how he weighed the elements of history, precedent, custom, and
social utility in reaching a decision, he was likely to reply, 'When Velazquez was asked
how he mixed his paints, he answered, 'With taste.""' Paul A. Freund, Foreword-
Homage to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 4 (1979).
' Frankfbrtes Harvard Law School fiend and colleague, Professor Paul Freund's
assessment was that
[wihile Frankfiter was not, as were John Marshall and Holmes and Brandeis,
an originator of transforming thought, he was a centrally influential figure in
law and government. His immense energy, both intellectual and physical; the
intensity of his caring for people and ideas; his unabashed reverence for the
institutions of America and its heroes; and his learning carried with exuberance
ignited the wide circle he reached, and left his imprint on them.
Paul A. Freund, Felix Fran fer, DicT. AM. BIo. 260, 264 (Supp. VII 1961-65).
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aspirations and efforts. Although he sometimes fell short,. 1 j his consis-
tent goals were judicial restraint accompanied by proper disinterest. In
that, he seems to have bested the best of his critics.
11 See supra note 9.
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